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Because antitrust litigation has increasingly involved foreign com-
merce,' much of the evidence in these cases consists of documents
physically located outside of the United States.2 Orders issued by a
United States court requiring the production of documents for in-
spection and copying,3 however, may entail the violation of the law
1. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), applies to foreign trade and commerce
if the conduct alleged to be an unreasonable restraint on trade has even a small effect on
domestic commerce. See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 42-43,
66-75 (2d ed. 1973); Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & Co.e. L. REv. 199 (1977). Domestic courts gen-
erally also have no difficulty in exercising in personam jurisdiction over foreign entities
that may violate the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Cofino, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., 1975-2
Trade Cas. 60,456, at 67,055 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (telex bids for coffee are sufficient activity
to confer in personam jurisdiction under New York long-arm statute).
The Supreme Court's decision that foreign nations have standing to sue under the
Sherman Act, Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), may also lead to
increased antitrust litigation involving foreign commerce. Such litigation is likely to
produce conflicts with foreign nondisclosure laws, because the Supreme Court has
previously decided that plaintiff nations are required to respond to discovery requests,
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 n.2 (1938). Problems with
foreign nondisclosure laws have also arisen in. the context of litigation under state anti-
trust statutes. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No. 50,827 (Dist. Ct.,
Santa Fe County, N.M. Mar. 2, 1978), appeal filed, No. 11,988 (Sup. Ct. N.M. May 3,
1978) (judgment based on N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1-1 to -6 (1953)).
2. See J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 94.09[1] (1977);
Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent
Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-production,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 747 (1974).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 allows the discovery of any nonprivileged information "reason-
ably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FrD. R. Crv. P. 34 and
its state law counterparts require the production of relevant documents that are in the
"possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served." It is
established that a foreign nondisclosure law does not interfere with control over docu-
ments within the meaning of the Rule. See United States v. Ciba Corp., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,026 (D.N.J. 1971) (subsidiary doing business in United States required to produce
documents held by foreign parent); In re Investigation of World Arrangements with
Relation to the Prod., Transp., Ref. & Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280, 285
(D.D.C. 1952) (American parent company required to produce documents in possession of
foreign subsidiary) [hereinafter cited as In re Investigation of World Arrangements].
If there is an objection to discovery, the requesting party may move for an order to
compel discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The production of documents by witnesses
in civil litigation is governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b). Rules 45 and 37 both provide that
a subpoena requiring the production of specified documents may be issued to a national
or resident of the United States who is in a foreign country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976).
Failure to comply with a subpoena is punishable by civil contempt. See id. § 1784.
A number of cases discussed in this Note concern grand jury subpoenas governed by
FED. R. CRIN. P. 17. Compared with discovery in civil litigation, criminal discovery is
narrowly circumscribed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. See 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAcricE &
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of a foreign nation4 prohibiting the disclosure of such documents. 5
In the past, conflicts between domestic discovery orders and foreign
nondisclosure laws have generated considerable international contro-
PROCEDURE §§ 251-252 (1969) (citing authorities). Since Rule 17 is "intended . . . to obtain
witnesses and documents for use as evidence," id. § 271, proceedings under it do not
present all the difficulties of the broader civil discovery devices. See generally pp. 624-25
infra. Failure to obey a subpoena without adequate excuse is punishable by contempt
under FED. R. Cm.Ut. P. 17(g).
4. Such statutes are of two basic types. The first type provides that a government
official may on his own initiative prohibit production of a class of documents. See, e.g.,
Foreign Proceedings (Piohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, Austl. Acts No. 121,
§ 5; Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, c. 87, § 2 (United Kingdom).
The British statute also imposes a duty on all persons engaged in maritime affairs to
report to the government any documents requested by foreign authority. Id. § 1(2)(a).
On the other hand, the statutes of two Canadian provinces prohibit the production of
any documents requested by a foreign tribunal unless such documents are normally sent
out of the province in the regular course of business. Business Records Protection Act,
1947, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 54 (1970); Business Concerns Records Act, 1964, QUE. REv. STAT.
c. 278 (1964).
In addition to legislation expressly prohibiting the removal of business records, more
general business secrets legislation may also operate to prevent the disclosurd of docu-
ments requested in American discovery. See Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956,
art. 39, Stb. 401, as amended by Act of July 16, 1958, Stb. 413 (Netherlands); STGB, C.P.,
CoD. PEN. § 271 (1971) (Switzerland).
5. A number of foreign nondisclosure laws have been enacted in direct response to
antitrust litigation in American courts in order to prevent what has been perceived abroad
as an American invasion of the territorial integrity of foreign nations. The order issued
in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Can. Int'l Paper Co., 72 F.
Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), requiring Canadian paper companies doing business in New
York to produce documents located in Canada, evoked protest from the government of
Canada. See INTERNATIONAL L.Av ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE
HELD AT TOKYO 565 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ILA, FIFTY-FRsT CONFERENCE REPORT].
The subpoenas were withdrawn after a conference between representatives of the Canadian
paper industry and the United States Department of Justice. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1968). However, the incident prompted the Province of
Ontario to pass legislation making it a criminal offense to remove business documents
ordered by foreign authority. See Business Records Protection Act, 1947, ONT. REV. STAT.
c. 54 (1970).
Orders for the production of documents of foreign oil companies issued in In re In-
vestigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952), resulted in orders from
the governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and Italy prohibiting
removal of the documents. See ILA, FIFTY FIRST-CONFERENCE REPORT, supra, at 569-73. At
the instigation of the United States National Security Council, the subpoenas were vacated
and the grand jury proceedings terminated. See In re Investigation of World Arrange-
ments, 1952-1953 Trade Cas. 67,480 (D.D.C. 1953) (vacating subpoenas); 6 M. WHITEMAN,
supra, at 173-74. Nevertheless, the Netherlands later enacted legislation prohibiting
compliance with the decisions of courts of foreign nations when such compliance would
affect economic competition. See Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, art. 39, Stb.
401, as amended by Act of July 16, 1958, Stb. 413.
The pending Westinghousc uranium contracts litigation, see In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977), has produced additional
foreign nondisclosure legislation. In Canada, the Atomic Energy Control Act, 1970, CAN.
REV. STAT. c. A-19, and the Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. S& R.
76-644 (1976), promulgated under the Act, prohibit the production of any document
relating to uranium marketing activities from 1972 through 1975 or oral testimony that
would result in the disclosure of the contents of such documents. In In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 283 (1977), the Ontario High Court of
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versy.6 The significant number of nations that have enacted such laws, 7
and the policy of the United States government to enforce domestic
antitrust laws in international commerce,8 suggest that conflicts with
foreign nondisclosure laws will continue to pose an important prob-
lem for domestic courts.
The two basic principles governing conflicts between domestically
issued discovery orders and foreign nondisclosure laws are contra-
dictory.9 The principle of lex fori holds that a domestic forum con-
trols its own procedure 0 and reflects the broader policy concern of
affording litigants a full and fair opportunity to prove their claims.,'
The principle of international comity, on the other hand, holds that
domestic courts should not take action that may cause the violation
of another nation's law.12 This principle reflects the broader policy
concern that each member of the family of nations should do "justice
that justice may be done in return."'13
Justice found that these regulations prohibited enforcement of an American letter rogatory
requesting documents. "A letter rogatory is a formal request, made by a court in which
an action is pending, to a foreign court to perform some judicial act." Stem, Interna-
tional Judicial Assistance (pt. 1), PRAc. LAw., Dec. 1968, at 22. See generally note 83 infra.
Immediately following the issuance of these and other letters rogatory in the Westing-
house uranium contracts litigation, the Australian Parliament passed legislation provid-
ing criminal penalties for the production of any documents concerning subjects designated
by the attorney general. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act,
1976, Austl. Acts No. 121. The Attorney General immediately designated uranium as a
protected subject. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d
273, 283 (1977).
6. See generally ILA, F'TY-FIRsT CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 565-92 (collect-
ing diplomatic protests).
7. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
8. See United States Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations
(Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in ANrnRusr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) § E, at 1, 3 (Feb. 1,
1977) (Justice Department will exercise "fullest permissible jurisdiction over those who
illegally cartelize our markets").
9. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (interest in ob-
taining evidence conflicts with respect for law of foreign states).
10. See Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444 (D.D.C. 1953),
modified, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956) ("foreign law
cannot be permitted to obstruct the investigation and discovery of facts in a case"); 3 J.
BEALE, CONFUCT OF LAWS 1600 (1935).
11. In an American forum, it is generally stated that there is a duty of the highest
order to "attend and disclose all that is needed for the ascertainment of truth." 8 J.
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2193, at 68 (3d ed. 1940). Such a duty applies to the production of
documents as well as to testimony, id., and all claims of exemption from the general
rule are disfavored, id. § 2192, at 67.
12. See J. STORY, CONFLICr OF LAWs § 35, at 34 (Boston 1834). For discussion of the
doctrine of international comity and the production of evidence, see Note, Ordering
Production of Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U. CH. L. REv.
791, 794-96 (1964).
13. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario. 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139
N.E. 259, 260 (1923).
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The case law fails to provide an adequate means for resolving this
policy conflict. In Societe Internationale v. Rogers,14 the Supreme
Court eschewed reliance on either the principle of lex fori or inter-
national comity. Instead, it called for a case-by-case decision about
whether sanctions should be imposed for noncompliance with a do-
mestic discovery order despite the interdictions of a foreign nondis-
closure law.15 But some subsequent cases have nevertheless been charac-
terized by an almost automatic deference to such nondisclosure laws.'
This Note will assess the current doctrines and existing proposals that
attempt to reconcile the principles of lex fori and international comity.
It will then argue that neither the courts nor the commentators
have succeeded in suggesting a meaningful rule to resolve the conflict
in policies. The Note will suggest that because this conflict is essen-
tially intractable, it should be minimized by the use of flexible pro-
cedures at the discovery phase of litigation. In order to guide the
discretion of federal courts in employing such flexible procedures,
the Note will conclude by suggesting four basic steps that should
be taken.
I. Scope of the Problem and Current Doctrine
A. The Problem
Conflicts between domestically issued discovery orders and foreign
nondisclosure laws have emerged in contexts other than antitrust
litigation.17 But, for a number of reasons, antitrust litigation is the
most demanding test case for any procedural innovation to minimize
conflicts with foreign nondisclosure laws. It has been observed that
"[t]he heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of busi-
ness documents,"' 8 and the great majority of cases involving foreign
prohibitions on discovery have been concerned with requests for such
14. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
15. Id. at 206; see In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563
F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977) (discussing Societe Internationale).
16. See, e.g., In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (Panamanian
law); First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948
(1960) (same); In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.), modified sub nom.
Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (Canadian law).
17. See, e.g., Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (case involving
Trading with the Enemy Act, § 9(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 9(a) (1970)); Montship Lines, Ltd. v.
Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (agency subpoena for ratemaking
proceeding).
18. Note, sutra note 2, at 747.
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business records and documents from large multinational companies. 19
The importance of documentary discovery to antitrust plaintiffs has
encouraged them to utilize fully the liberal discovery provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to reach documents lo-
cated abroad, and has tempted defendants to use contrived excuses
of foreign illegality as a dilatory tactic.20 More importantly, foreign
nations have been sensitive to discovery when documents are sought
for use in domestic antitrust litigation,21 "because, among other rea-
sons, such legislation reflects national economic policy which may not
coincide, and may be indirectly in conflict, with that of other states." 22
This continuing international hostility to the application of American
antitrust laws to international transactions underscores the importance
of devising procedures to minimize conflicts with foreign nondis-
closure laws in antitrust litigation.
Since the Supreme Court's holding in Societe Internationale, domes-
tic courts have rejected a per se rule and have attempted to reach a
decision on sanctions by a case-by-case accommodation of the policies
underlying the principles of lex fori and comity. Courts have recog-
nized that the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with a
domestic discovery order places the party in a difficult situation since
any course of action will entail possible punishment by one country
or the other.23 On the other hand, deference to foreign law may en-
courage persons to violate domestic law by maintaining records in
nations that prohibit their release.2 4
Despite the difficulties presented by conflicts between domestic
19. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d
992, 994 (10th Cir. 1977) (subpoena for purposes of deposition and production of business
records); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1969) (subpoena
to produce business records).
20. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co.. 570 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir. 1978)
(claims of conflict with Swiss nondisclosure law used as "diversionary tactics"); United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No. 50,827, slip op. at 9 27-30 (Dist. Ct. Santa Fe
County, N.M. Mar. 2, 1978), appeal filed, No. 11,988 (Sup. Ct. N.M. May 3, 1978) (de-
fendant delayed production until nondisclosure regulations went into effect).
21. See pp. 613-14 & note 5 supra (Australian, Canadian, and Dutch nondisclosure
legislation prompted by American antitrust litigation).
22. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 125
(House of Lords) (discussing position of Great Britain).
23. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532 F.2d 404, 410
(5th Cir. 1976) ("We regret that our decision requires Mr. Field to violate the legal com-
mands of the Cayman Islands, his country of residence.")
24. For example, in United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No. 50,827 (Dist. Ct.
Santa Fe County, N.M. Mar. 2, 1978), appeal filed, No. 11,988 (Sup. Ct. N.M. May 3,
1978), the court found that the defendant had followed a deliberate policy of maintaining
documents in Canada where they would be shielded by Canadian law. Id. slip op. at
37-40.
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discovery orders and foreign law, domestic courts have been too
willing to adopt a position that requires them to confront this prob-
lem. Current doctrine suggests that the question whether a discovery
order should issue is solely a matter of American law; foreign non-
disclosure laws are only relevant in deciding whether sanctions should
be imposed for disobedience.2 5 Thus, the problem has generally been
considered in the context of a contempt or sanctions hearing.26 At
this late stage of the litigation, the potential for avoiding conflicts
is minimal.
The decisions suggest two possible rules to guide a court in deciding
whether to impose sanctions in a given case. The first focuses on the
issue of whether there was a "good faith" effort by the party resisting
discovery to avoid the limitations of the foreign law; the second in-
volves a judicial "balancing" of the competing interests of the parties
and jurisdictions. Neither rule provides any real guidance for a court's
decision about sanctions, and conflicts between domestic discovery
orders and foreign nondisclosure laws have continued to be prob-
lematic.
B. Good Faith
The Supreme Court articulated the good faith test in Societe In-
ternationale, which arose when a Swiss holding company sued under
section 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act 27 to recover enemy-
owned property seized by the United States government during World
War 1.28 The district court dismissed the suit because of plaintiff's
failure to produce documents, release of which was prohibited by
Swiss law.2 9 The Supreme Court reversed, suggesting that a crucial
factor in deciding whether to impose sanctions for noncompliance
with a discovery order was whether there was a good faith effort to
25. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1096 (1977) ("Societe implies that consideration of foreign law problems in a dis-
covery context is required in dealing with sanctions to be imposed for disobedience and
not in deciding whether the discovery order should issue."); Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D.
39, 81 (1963) (foreign law only at issue in determining sanctions for noncompliance).
26. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir. 1978) (FED.
R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation,
563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (contempt order).
27. 50 U.S.C. app. § 9(a) (1970).
28. For a detailed history of the litigation, see Note, Limitations on the Federal
Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1441, 1458 n.159
(1963).
29. Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 447-48 (D.D.C. 1953) (order
conditionally dismissing suit and allowing plaintiff three months to secure documents).
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avoid the limitations of the foreign nondisclosure law.30 The Court
contrasted the existence of a good faith effort with the active court-
ing of legal impediments.31 But despite the fact that plaintiff's good
faith was established,32 the subpoena was not quashed,33 and the ef-
fect of the good faith test was left unclear.3 4
The requirement of good faith has subsequently been used to
punish the use of dilatory tactics in discovery. For example, in United
Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.,35 a New Mexico district court
entered a default judgment against the defendants under New Mexico
Rule of Civil Procedure 3736 for failure to produce documents lo-
cated in the files of Gulf Minerals Canada, Ltd. In the face of two
sets of interrogatories requesting the identification of documents lo-
cated in Canada, defendant General Atomic refused to identify the
documents and filed unresponsive answers. Since several orders di-
recting discovery had been issued and an agreement between the
parties to produce the documents had been made prior to the adop-
tion of the Canadian uranium security regulations prohibiting pro-
duction,37 the court held that the defendant had deliberately delayed
production and courted legal impediments to the production of the
documents.38 Accordingly, it imposed sanctions for the defendant's
failure to produce by granting a default judgment on liability in
favor of the plaintiffs, and later awarded damages.3 9
Neither Societe Internationale nor United Nuclear, however, spec-
ify what steps must be taken by a party resisting discovery to satisfy
the requirements of "good faith," because such a determination is
30. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958). See In re Investigation
of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1952) (postponing motion to quash
subpoena for documents located abroad pending bona fide attempt of foreign com-
panies to obtain governments' consent to produce).
31. 357 U.S. at 209.
32. Id.
33. However, the litigation was finally settled. See Note, suPra note 28, at 1458 n.159.
34. The Supreme Court suggested that, despite plaintiff's good faith, the district court
might draw inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff with reference to specific events. 357
U.S. at 213.
35. No. 50,827 (Dist. Ct. Santa Fe County, N.M. Mar. 2, 1978), appeal filed, No. 11,988
(Sup. Ct. N.M. May 3, 1978) (action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and state anti-
trust law violations).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(37) (1953) (closely parallels FED. R. Civ. P. 37).
37. STAT. 0. & R. 76-644 (1976). The normal penalty for violation of the regulations is
a fine of $5,000 and two years' imprisonment and the maximum penalty is a fine of
$10,000 and 5 years' imprisonment. CAN. Rav. STAT. c. A.-19, 19.
38. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No. 50,827, slip op. at 40 (Dist. Ct.
Santa Fe County, N.M. Mar. 2, 1978), appeal filed, No. 11,988 (Sup. Ct. N.M. May 3, 1978).
39. The court ordered specific performance of defendants' uranium supply contracts.
Id. No. 50,827 (Dist. Ct. Santa Fe County, N.M. May 17, 1978), appeal filed, No. 12,052
(Sup. Ct. N.M. June 13, 1978).
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made on a case-by-case basis when a court decides whether or not to
impose sanctions. It is not even clear whether a good faith effort
that meets with failure is, by itself, a sufficient excuse for nonpro-
duction.40 But even if the notion of "good faith" could be meaning-
fully defined, a test excusing noncompliance with a domestic discovery
order because of the "good faith" of a party is unsatisfactory. Such a
test, by allowing the concern for fairness to one party to dominate
all other concerns, gives insufficient weight to the principle of lex fori.
For this reason the "good faith" test has been supplanted by the
"balancing of interests" test.
C. "Balancing of Interests"
In 1965, the American Law Institute adopted a "balancing of in-
terests" approach to conflicts with foreign nondisclosure laws in sec-
tion 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States. Section 40 acknowledges that when two states ex-
ercise jurisdiction, each may require inconsistent conduct by the same
person. It suggests that each state is required by international law
to moderate the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in light of
the following factors: (a) the vital national interests of each of the
states, (b) the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon a person, (c) the extent to which the re-
quired conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and (e) the extent to which an
enforcement action can be expected to achieve compliance. 41
Section 40 has been very influential.42 In United States v. First
National City Bank,43 the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment of civil
contempt against the bank and one of its officers for failure to pro-
duce documents located in Germany as required by a subpoena duces
40. See note 34 supra. In some cases, courts seem to have viewed the requirement of
good faith as being coextensive with substantial compliance with the discovery order. See,
e.g., Calcutta E. Coast of India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 399 F.2d 994, 997 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (good faith found when waivers sought
and obtained for most documents). But see In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Con-
tracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992, 998 (10th Cir. 1977) (good faith found when waiver sought,
but not obtained).
41. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS L&W OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965).
42. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d
992 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
But cf. Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 18-20 (1966) (no authority sup-
ports § 40 as requirement of international law).
43. 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
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tecum issued by a federal grand jury investigating possible violations
of the antitrust laws.44 The bank introduced evidence that compliance
with the subpoena would subject it to liability in contract or tort; 45
in "balancing" the interests of the United States and Germany under
the Restatement test, the court found the American interest of greater
weight since the antitrust laws were the "cornerstones of this nation's
economic policies." 40
The Tenth Circuit also employed the "balancing of interests" test
in In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Liti-
gation.47 There, the court reversed a contempt order48 against a Dela-
ware corporation and its Canadian president for refusing to produce
documents relating to uranium production located in Canada. The
contemnors claimed that compliance would be a violation of Canadian
criminal law.49 In balancing the interests of the United States and
Canada under the Restatement test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
Canada had a legitimate national interest in controlling atomic en-
ergy,50 and this interest was entitled to greater weight than the in-
terest of the United States in affording litigants adequate discovery.r'
The court, however, was careful to point out that it was not dealing
with any "enforcement, as such, of antitrust laws."' 2 The dissenting
judge used the same "balancing of interests" test to reach the opposite
conclusion: "When the strong underlying policy reasons in connection
with the discovery rules are pitted against the Canadian policy of
protecting its local industries from insufficient prices, no real contest
exists." 53
The Westinghouse and First National City Bank cases indicate that
the balancing test offers no real principles for resolving the basic
44. Id. at 900. The bank was fined $2,000 per day and its officer sentenced to 90 days'
imprisonment. Id.
45. Id. at 900 n.6. Each party provided sharply conflicting expert testimony on the
effect of German law, and the court found the prospect of liability "remote and specula-
tive." Id.
46. Id. at 903.
47. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
48. The district court, in an unreported order, fined the corporation until such time
as it complied with the subpoena. Id. at 994.
49. See Atomic Energy Control Act, 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. c. A-19.
50. 563 F.2d at 998-99. The court relied, in part, on the opinion of the Ontario
Supreme Court denying the enforcement of letters rogatory that Westinghouse had caused
to be issued in the same action. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co.,
16 Ont. 2d 273 (1977).
51. 563 F.2d at 999.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1003 (Doyle, J., dissenting). The dissent relied on a Canadian government
press release expressing a policy in support of the uranium industry, which was
-suffering from an oversupply and low price situation." Id. at 1001.
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policy conflict between lex fori and international comity. The bal-
ancing test provides that a good faith effort to produce, in itself, is
not a sufficient excuse for nonproduction. But it fails to specify what
an adequate excuse would be. Instead of focusing on the behavior of
the party resisting discovery, the balancing test forces a federal judge
to make a decision on applicable law based upon ill-defined notions
of competing national interests. Judicial respect for the national poli-
cies embodied in the United States antitrust laws also supports a gen-
eral agreement among the courts that excuses for failure to produce
documents are entitled to little, if any, weight in litigation seeking
to enforce those policies.54 Instead of giving sufficient weight to the
principle of international comity in the context of domestic anti-
trust litigation, the balancing test usually allows the concern for full
discovery to dominate over all other concerns.
II. Inadequacy of Existing Proposals
Proposed solutions to the problems raised by the foreign nondis-
closure laws fall into three basic categories: international treaties,
domestic legislation, and the use of a conflicts-of-law approach. Most
commentators who have recently addressed the problem propose an
international treaty as a solution.5- Two types have been suggested:
treaties dealing with the substance of the antitrust laws and treaties
dealing with discovery procedures. Neither, however, appears to be
a realistic possibility. Although there have been a number of pro-
posals for international coordination of antitrust laws,o it has been
observed that such proposals "stand little chance of implementation
in the short run."7 The reaction of foreign governments to the
54. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992,
999 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. First Nat'1 City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902-03 (2d Cir.
1968); American Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-Mansville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879, 880
(W.D. Pa. 1971).
55. See, e.g., Jones, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Antitrust: An International "Hot
Potato", 11 INT'L LAw. 415, 435 (1977); Note, supra note 2, at 770-74.
56. See, e.g., Fine, The Control of Restrictive Business Practices in International
Trade-A Viable Proposal for an International Trade Organization, 7 INT'L LAw. 635
(1973); Jones, supra note 55, at 435. Discussions about such cooperation within the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development have been "exploratory." Fugate,
An Overview of Antitrust Enforcement and the Multinational Corporation, 8 J. INT'L L.
& EcoN. 1, 8 (1973).
The Fulton-Rogers Agreement, an informal arrangement made in 1969 under which
the United States and Canada agreed to consult before extraterritorial enforcement of
the antitrust laws, was in force during the Westinghouse litigation. See [1970] CAN. Y.B.
INT'L L. 268. But the opportunity for consultation did not resolve the problems posed by
Canadian prohibitions on discovery, and the matter was left to the American courts.
57. Note, supra note 2, at 771 n.102; see p. 616 supra.
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Westinghouse litigation, for example, indicates that the prospects for
international agreement are remote.58 Similarly, an international treaty
on obtaining evidence79 or on pretrial discovery60 is unlikely to be
of any utility in the antitrust area, because foreign laws on nondis-
closure often reflect specific hostility to United States antitrust en-
forcement in the international sphere.6 Negotiations on the Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters6 2 began in 1965, and the treaty was finally ratified in 1972.
Yet its provisions fall far short of those necessary to resolve the con-
flict between foreign nondisclosure laws and American discovery or-
ders.6, The fact that the most important international agreement in
this area required nearly a decade to be accepted, and failed to address
the major problems, suggests that there is little merit to the view
that the treaty alternative is a practical way to resolve the problem.
A second possible solution would be for Congress to enact a law
requiring that foreign companies transacting business in this country
and United States companies doing business abroad produce for use
in the United States records located abroad or keep duplicates in the
United States available on demand for production. Such a bill was
introduced before Congress in 195164 and again before two subse-
quent sessions, 65 but was never passed. The same international hostili-
ty that has prevented the successful negotiation of a treaty would tend
to interfere with the enactment of domestic legislation.66
58. See Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 125
(House of Lords); In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d
273, 292 (1977).
59. See Magnusson, The Need for International Agreement on Obtaining Evidence
from Foreign Countries, 26 FED. B.J. 232, 246-47 (1966).
60. See Note, subra note 2, at 771-74.
61. See note 5 sutra. For example, the bilateral treaty signed with Switzerland in
1973, which provides for discretionary assistance in obtaining evidence in criminal pro-
ceedings (principally those involving organized crime), specifically exempts evidence for
antitrust proceedings. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 23, 1973,
United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302; see 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 349,
353-54 (1974).
62. July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
63. Article 23 of the agreement specifically provides that a state may declare that it
will not enforce a letter rogatory for pretrial discovery, and Article 12 allows a refusal
to execute a letter rogatory if the letter would infringe the "sovereignty or security" of
the executing state. 23 U.S.T. at 2568.
64. H.R. REs. 7339, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). The bill would have amended the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-21, 22-27, 44 (1976) (as amended), to require produc-
tion of documents abroad from United States corporations and to require foreign corpora-
tions to enter into an agreement to produce documents related to their business.
65. H.R. REs. 642, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. REs. 391, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953).
66. In 1961, the House voted to amend § 21 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C.
§ 820 (1970) (as amended), to require common carriers by water to the United States to
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The third type of solution that has been proposed is the adoption
of a conflict-of-laws approach to foreign nondisclosure laws.67 In es-
sence, however, such proposals differ little from the "balancing of
interests" test embodied in section 40 of the Restatement. Both ap-
proaches require a court to weigh undefined policies and incom-
parable statutes in a way that may bear little relationship to the
behavior of the parties before the court.68 A conflict-of-laws approach
thus offers no principles for resolving the conflict between domestic
discovery orders and foreign nondisclosure laws. A per se rule about
sanctions, even if it could be developed, would necessarily compro-
mise one of the important policies embodied in the doctrines of lex
fori and comity. More is required than simply an exhortation to dis-
trict judges to "exercise good judgment and common sense."' 69 In-
stead, clear, well-defined standards are needed to guide the discretion
of courts in ordering the production of documents and imposing sanc-
tions for noncompliance when foreign nondisclosure laws are involved.
III. Guiding Judicial Discretion in Ordering Discovery and
Imposing Sanctions for Noncompliance
Rather than resolving the conflict between domestic discovery or-
ders and foreign nondisclosure laws at a late stage in the litigation
on an essentially standardless case-by-case basis, courts should avoid
the conflict by the use of more flexible procedures. The problems
of foreign nondisclosure laws are best dealt with in the discovery
phase of litigation when judges have considerable discretion under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This would enable courts to
avoid the large majority of conflicts between their discovery orders
and foreign nondisclosure laws.
A. A Suggested Procedure for Avoiding Conflicts
Beginning at the discovery stage, there are four steps that courts
should follow.
produce records and information "wherever located." H.R. REs. 6775, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1961); see H.R. REP. No. 498, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1961). The amendment
produced such a storm of international protest, however, that it was dropped by the
Senate. See 107 CONG. REc. 21,143 (1961) (Sen. Engle).
67. See, e.g., Sandberg, The Extraterritorial Reach of American Economic Regulation:
The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARv. INT'L L.J. 315, 330-34 (1976) (arguing jurisdiction
should be based on "dominant interest" in transaction); 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 679, 688-90
(1976) (arguing "national interests" should be weighed).
68. See, e.g., p. 620 supra (example of "balancing test").
69. Metzger, supra note 42, at 19.
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Step 1: The party resisting discovery on the ground of a foreign
nondisclosure law should be required to make a prima facie showing
that there is a conflict between the foreign law and the court's dis-
covery order. Such a requirement is necessary in order to prevent the
use of claims of foreign illegality as a dilatory tactic in discovery. For
example, in Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,70 the defendant delayed
the ultimate production of the documents for over a year "on the
contrived excuse, eventually abandoned, of the Swiss secrecy laws.""
In imposing sanctions for the delay,72 the district court suggested the
criteria that a party must meet if it wishes to raise a foreign non-
disclosure law as an excuse for nonproduction: (a) the foreign non-
disclosure law must be alleged promptly and with particularity; (b)
the requested documents must be promptly identified; and (c) there
must be a prompt showing that the documents fall within the scope
of the foreign law73 The initial imposition of such requirements
would probably have avoided the problem of dilatory tactics in both
United Nuclear74 and First National City Bank.73
Step 2: Once a prima .facie showing that a conflict exists has been
made, a domestic court should determine whether the failure of one
party to produce the requested evidence will significantly prejudice
the other. It has been observed that "[i]t makes little sense to inter-
fere with another State's jurisdiction to obtain irrelevant documents."70
This is not a problem in grand jury investigations or criminal anti-
trust litigation because the subpoena is narrowly limited to the dis-
covery of documentary evidence for use at trial. 77 However, in civil
antitrust litigation, courts should use a standard of direct relevancy,
70. 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978) (affirming Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12 (D.
Colo. 1977)) (action for fraudulent misrepresentation).
71. Id. at 1374.
72. The district court imposed a sanction under FED. R. Crv. P. 37 requiring the pay-
ment of attorney's fees for the costs of obtaining a compulsory discovery order. 75 F.R.D.
at 25-26. Rule 37 permits a wide range of sanctions, including contempt, an order that
designated facts be taken as established, a judgment by default, and dismissal of tile
action. See generally Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of
Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1978) (arguing for more extensive use of
discovery sanctions).
73. 75 F.R.D. at 16-20.
74. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., No. 50,827, slip op. at - 38-40 (Dist.
Ct. Santa Fe County, N.M. Mar. 2, 1978), appeal filed, No. 11,988 (Sup. Ct., N.M. May 3,
1978) (defendant delayed production until Canadian nondisclosure regulations adopted).
75. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968) (bank
did not attempt to ascertain location of subpoenaed documents).
i6. Onkelinx, Conflict of Intcrnational Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Docu-
ments in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 487, 533 (1969).
77. FED. R. ClaI. P. 17; see note 3 supra.
624
Vol. 88: 612, 1979
Foreign Nondisclosure and Antitrust Discovery
which standard would be stricter than that currently set by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,78 when foreign nondisclosure laws are in-
volved. This principle has been recognized and applied in a num-
ber of cases. 79 For example, the Second Circuit considered the issue
of relevancy in upholding a decision not to compel the production
of documents revealing the identity of Swiss bank account holders,
when production was illegal under Swiss law, on the ground that the
identity of the bank's customers was "relatively unimportant" to the
proceeding.8 0 The use of a direct relevancy standard would restrict
the scope of discovery in civil litigation, and might create some ad-
ditional incentives to maintain records in countries that prohibit their
release. Such a standard, however, would often be essential for Step
3 of the suggested procedure, and it would bring American practices
more into line with prevailing standards in the international com-
munity."'
Step 3: Once the court has determined that a conflict may exist
and that the documents in question are directly relevant, there may
still be an issue as to the scope of the foreign law. 2 In such cases,
recourse should be had to the letters rogatory procedure, by which a
foreign tribunal is requested to use its good offices to obtain evidence
for a domestic proceeding.8, Some countries will not enforce a letter
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 allows the discovery of any nonpriviledged information "relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action," as long as it appears "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
79. Von der Heydt v. Kennedy, 299 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 916
(1962), provides an illustration of the "direct relevancy" standard. There, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal of an action by a Swiss
citizen under the Trading with the Enemy Act for his failure to comply with a discovery
order of the court, because the documents not produced were directly relevant to the
government's defense that the plaintiff was "enemy-tainted." Id. at 460. See also Calcutta
E. Coast of India & E. Pakistan/U.S.A. Conference v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 399 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (agency sanction for noncompliance with administrative subpoena set
aside in absence of showing that requested information was necessary for proceeding).
80. Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1972) (action on
fidelity bond).
81. See pp. 627-28 infra.
82. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1969)
(scope of German law unclear).
83. See note 5 sutra (defining letters rogatory); 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1976) (authorizing
transmittal of letters rogatory). The letters rogatory procedure may be used to examine
persons, or to secure the inspection of documents and other real or personal property.
Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J. 651,
652 n.10 (1969); see, e.g., Uebersee Finanz-Korporation v. Brownell, 121 F. Supp. 420,
425-26 (D.D.C. 1954) (court issued letters rogatory for taking of depositions in Switzerland).
Although the letters rogatory procedure does present some difficulties, see Jones, Interna-
tional Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J.
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rogatory that appears to be a discovery order issued under the liberal
standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 4 Greater use of
the letters rogatory procedure should avoid many otherwise difficult
conflicts, particularly in situations in which the scope of the foreign
nondisclosure law is not clear.sa
Step 4: Once the applicability of a foreign law is established either
by foreign authority or a letter rogatory, the court should require
that the party resisting discovery seek a waiver of foreign law. 6 Waiv-
ers obtained from the Swiss government, for example, permitted sub-
stantial compliance in the Societe Internationale litigation. 7 An im-
portant advantage of the requirement that the resisting party seek a
waiver is that it allows the foreign government to determine whether
it wishes to pursue its nondisclosure policy in the context of a par-
ticular litigation. Furthermore, the request for a waiver may help
avoid unfair results. For example, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(United States v. Field),88 the Fifth Circuit affirmed an order of con-
tempt entered against a resident of the Grand Cayman Islands, British
West Indies, for refusing to testify before a federal grand jury in-
vestigating possible tax violations. Under the Cayman Bank Secrecy
Act such testimony could carry criminal penalties of up to six months'
imprisonment.8 9 Apart from the serious Fifth Amendment questions
515, 529-30 (1953) (delay, authentication, expense, and translation), many of these prob-
lems have been ameliorated by the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
84. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 287-88
(1977) (letter rogatory not enforced when issued as mere discovery order); Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 86-88, 127-29 (House of Lords)
(same); RCA v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 Q.B. 618, 649 (English courts will not countenance
American "fishing expeditions").
85. For example, in Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960), the court quashed a
subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the letters rogatory procedure was available,
and noted that it was desirable to have "Canadian statutes passed upon by Canadian
courts." Id. at 151. But cf. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.
1968) (conflicting expert testimony rather than letter rogatory used to ascertain German
law).
86. Such waiver requirements were imposed in: In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297
F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147,
156 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The
waiver requirement was particularly effective in recent litigation involving alleged patent
and antitrust violations by a British manufacturer of Ampicillin. The requirement im-
posed on the British firm that it negotiate with its government to allow production
resulted in the final production of almost all documents. See Note, supra note 2, at 761-
64 (discussing unreported order in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 50,
Misc. 45-70 (D.D.C. May 25, 1973)).
87. Over 190,000 documents were produced. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197, 203 (1958).
88. 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
89. Id. at 406.
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involved,90 the wisdom of this contempt order is highly questionable;
the conflict between the grand jury subpoena and bank secrecy law
of the Cayman Islands might well have been avoided through an or-
der to the witness to seek a waiver from the foreign government. 91
B. Suggested Guidelines When Conflict is Unavoidable
The procedure suggested above represents a means of reconciling
the principles of lex fori and international comity by using flexible
procedures to avoid conflict between domestic discovery orders and
foreign nondisclosure laws. Inevitably, however, some such conflicts
will still arise, and courts must decide whether to impose sanctions
for noncompliance with a discovery order.
As a general rule, a domestic court should be extremely reluctant
to impose sanctions in an international antitrust case, since the dis-
covery rules and substantive laws of the United States are at odds with
those of its major trading partners.92 In the last analysis, the barriers
placed on discovery abroad reflect a continuing international hostility
to an American theory of jurisdiction that mandates the application of
our antitrust law to transactions that seriously affect foreign national
economies. 93 Non-antitrust litigation that touches foreigners may in-
volve issues that are less controversial in the international communi-
90. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected arguments that the contempt order violated
the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination. Id. at 406-07. The court noted
that the defendant did not argue that the content of his answers would subject him to
criminal prosecution in the Cayman Islands, and concluded that "[t]he Fifth Amendment
simply is not pertinent to the situation where a foreign state makes the act of testifying
a criminal offense." Id. at 407 (emphasis supplied). In Societe Internationale, the Supreme
Court made a similar distinction. 357 U.S. at 211.
Since all of the foreign nondisclosure law cases have involved statutes that make the
act of production a crime, it remains an open question whether the mere revelation of
facts that would lead to incrimination under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction is within
the scope of the Fifth Amendment. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1963)
(witness may not be compelled to give testimony in one domestic jurisdiction that would
be used to convict him in another domestic jurisdiction).
91. One criticism of this approach is that by "coercing" waivers, legal institutions are
in a sense converted into political and diplomatic policynakers and enforcers. Note, supra
note 2, at 770. Yet, this is precisely the role that any court plays in a case involving con-
flicts between the laws of different nations. The requirement that a party resisting dis-
covery attempt to obtain a waiver of foreign law facilitates a form of international
judicial diplomacy in resolving inconsistent national policy objectives within the context
of a narrow legal dispute.
92. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273,
287-88 (1977) (discovery procedures); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
[1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 86-88, 127-29 (House of Lords) (same); Whitney, Sources of Conflict
Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 655, 659-60 (1954). See
generally W. FUGATE, supra note 1, at 467-91.
93. See Whitney, supra note 92, at 660.
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ty,94 and contempt orders may be appropriate in such cases. But in
antitrust litigation, contempt orders should be used only for refusals
to follow the procedures proposed here. When forced to choose be-
tween imposing sanctions for noncompliance and recognizing a foreign
nondisclosure law in litigation that is international in scope, American
judges must bear in mind that their decisions will inevitably be
measured against prevailing standards in the community of nations.
94. For example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a contempt citation against a party who
failed to respond to a subpoena issued in a grand jury investigation of income tax
evasion; the court pointed out that the United States was not exceptional in granting
wide powers to investigators to obtain information concerning tax evasion from foreign
financial institutions. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532 F.2d
404, 408 (4th Cir. 1976) (citing English authority).
